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Introduction and Background  
On December 19, 2008, the American government under the Bush 
administration, agreed to extend financial assistance to the automobile 
industry. This was the culmination of months of deliberation in the Congress 
about the future of the business. In spite of the serious implications of 
refusing to assist the industry, the mood among the American public was not 
favorable toward a government bailout. Government financial assistance to 
the “Big 3,” as the three major American automobile companies are called, 
was in the form of federal loans of $9.4 billion to General Motors (GM) and 
$4 billion to Chrysler. In addition, GM received a Treasury Department loan 
of $6 billion, and Ford was granted a line of credit of $9 billion.1 Only two 
months earlier, in October 2008, the United States government had provided 
assistance to the banking industry in the amount of $700 billion under the 
Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP). The TARP funds, initially 
identified for the financial sector, were used for the auto-industry bailout. 
The restructuring of the industry, which began with President Bush, would 
continue in 2009 under newly elected President Obama. The bailout action, 
although patently antithetical to the laissez faire tenets of capitalism, was 
embraced by the highly capitalistic financial and automobile industries. 
However, the United States government assistance to the 
automobile industry in 2008 was by no means a new phenomenon. In the 
mid-1970s, the first major increases in the price of oil – which were 
implemented by OPEC (Organization of Oil Exporting Countries) – resulted 
in an economic downturn that affected the global economy. The resulting 
decrease in consumer demand for goods and services was manifested 
                                                 
1 Jennifer Chamberlain, “The Big Three: Bailout or Bankruptcy?” Illinois 
Business Law Journal, March 7, 2009 (accessed July 18, 2017 https:// 
publish.illinois.edu/illinoisblj/2009/03/07/the-big-three-bailout-or-bankrupt 
cy). 
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worldwide. The global automobile industry was particularly vulnerable 
because of the additional factor of increased gasoline prices. In the United 
States and worldwide, consumer preference for Japanese automobile imports 
increased due to the fuel-efficiency of Japanese manufactures. The 
combination of recession and lower demand for American-manufactured 
automobiles translated into lower sales and profits for the domestic industry. 
The resulting trade imbalance ignited conflict between the two countries. 
With Japan experiencing a favorable balance of trade with the United States, 
both governments intervened in their respective automobile industry. For 
Japan, government intervention fell under the country's explicit industrial 
policies that dictated support for industry in the form of trade protection, 
allocations of foreign exchange, research and development subsidies, loans 
at below-market interest rates and favorable tax treatment.2 The United States 
government, on the other hand, took a more subtle approach, cloaking its 
intervention under the free trade doctrine implicit in the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). In 1981, after discussions between the 
American government and Japanese automobile industry representatives, the 
latter agreed to voluntarily reduce the number of automobiles they exported 
to the United States. This agreement was made under the Voluntary Export 
Restraint (VER) program, which, despite being contradictory to the principle 
of free trade, was considered a legitimate trade policy within GATT. 
This study uses a rent-seeking framework to analyze the United 
States-Japan automobile trade conflict of the 1980s. The central theme of the 
paper is that decisions made by the governments of the United States and 
Japan led to the creation of rent-seeking opportunities in their respective 
automobile industries. In the United States, government intervention created 
competition between that industry and consumers for the ensuing rents; 
whereas in Japan, the automobile industry was set to be the sole beneficiary 
of the rents. The article is organized as follows: the first section traces the 
development of rent-seeking theory. The form and substance of intervention 
by the United States and Japanese governments in their respective 
automobile sector is addressed in the two sections that follow. The overall 
impact of the voluntary export restraint on economic players in both countries 
is then analyzed. In the last two sections, liberalization and government 
intervention are discussed.  
                                                 
2 Robert J. Carbaugh, International Economics (Cincinnati, OH: South-
Western College Publishing, 2000), 217. 
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The Theory of Rent-Seeking  
The sustaining factor of the market system is the price mechanism 
which works to efficiently allocate resources. It is the function of price to co-
ordinate the wants of individuals, rising when goods are scarce, and falling 
when there is a surplus. The market lies at the core of the capitalist economic 
system in which the means of production are owned by a small group of 
individuals, and government intervention is verboten. Realistically, at times, 
the market does fail to perform its allocative function, and it becomes 
necessary for government to intervene to address this failure. Such 
government intervention includes restrictions on economic activity, ranging 
across the spectrum from protection against imports to the promotion of 
monopoly power.  
In a 1954 article, Arnold C. Harberger presented an empirical model 
to measure the welfare loss to society due to monopoly power. Using a graph 
of the market system, he calculated these costs as a triangle contiguous to the 
market demand and supply curves, and aptly named it “Harberger triangle.”3 
Gordon Tullock4 used the Harberger triangle as the basis for calculating costs 
to society due to tariffs and monopoly, concluding that the losses to society 
were greater than those falling within the Harberger triangle. He identified 
these additional costs as the resources necessary to sustain monopoly power 
or a tariff. In 1974, Anne O. Kreuger5 investigated the effects of quantitative 
restrictions on imports imposed by the governments of India and Turkey. She 
pointed out that these government restrictions created competition for import 
licenses, and consequently increased total welfare costs. These higher 
welfare costs, Kreuger found, were because of the combined value of the 
tariffs and what she termed “rents.” Kreuger ascribed the term rents to the 
benefits to some economic agents from government regulation, and “rent-
seeking” to describe the competition among economic agents for these 
benefits. While credit must be given to Kreuger for coining this term rent-
seeking in her 1974 article, Tullock had applied the very theory seven years 
earlier. 
                                                 
3 Arnold C. Harberger “Monopoly and Resource Allocation,” American 
Economic Review 44/2 (1954): 77–87. 
4 Gordon Tullock, “The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies and Theft,” 
Western Economic Journal 5/3 (1967): 224–232. 
5 Anne O. Kreuger, “The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society,” 
The American Economic Review 64/3 (1974): 291–303. 
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An extensive literature has developed on rent-seeking since the 
origination of the term. Bhagwati,6 Appelbaum and Katz,7 and Wenders8 are 
among those who have researched and written extensively on this subject. 
The theory has since been broadened and applied to other situations besides 
trade protection and monopoly. For example, Boyce9 investigated rent 
seeking in the allocation of natural resource quotas, while Bishop and Liu10 
applied it to the liberalization in China’s labor markets. In the interim, rent-
seeking has also undergone definitional changes overtime. Since its 
inception, rent-seeking has been variously defined as: the resource-wasting 
activities of individuals seeking transfers of wealth through the aegis of the 
state; the behavior in institutional settings where individual efforts to 
maximize value generate social waste rather than social surplus; the pursuit 
of profits via the use of government coercion; and the expenditure of scarce 
resources to capture an artificially created transfer.11 In spite of the many 
definitions of the term, the core argument sustains – rent-seeking activity 
results from government intervention in the economy, and though some of 
the players may benefit from such activities, government intervention in the 
economy leads to inefficiency.  
 
United States Government Intervention 
Until the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO), GATT 
was the body that oversaw world trade since the United Nations created a 
new international monetary system in the post-World War II era. In 1944, 
representatives from United Nations met at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, 
and established the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as well as the 
                                                 
6 J. N. Bhagwati, “Directly Unproductive, Profit-seeking (DUP) Activities,” 
Journal of Political Economy 90 (1982): 988–1002. 
7 Elie Appelbaum and Eliakim Katz, “Transfer Seeking and Avoidance: On 
the Full Social Costs of Rent Seeking,” Public Choice 48/2 (1986): 175–181. 
8 J. T. Wenders, “On Perfect Rent Dissipation,” American Economic Review 
77 (1987): 456–459. 
9 John R. Boyce, “Rent-Seeking in Natural Resource Allocations,” Public 
Choice 96 3/4 (1998): 271–294.  
10 John A. Bishop and Haiyong Liu. “Liberalization and Rent-Seeking in 
China’s Labor Market,” Public Choice 135 3/4 (2008): 151–164. 
11 Steven G. Medema, “Another Look at the Problem of Rent Seeking,” 
Journal of Economic Issues 25/4 (1991): 1049–1065. 
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International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), commonly 
known as the World Bank. The GATT was signed in 1947, with the initial 
intention of extending the agreement to create a new entity by 1948, to be 
named the International Trade Organization (ITO). This new body would join 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund as the third Bretton 
Woods organization. However, this plan did not materialize. Instead, on 
January 1, 1995, GATT was replaced by the WTO rather than the planned 
ITO. From its creation in 1947 to its dissolution at the end of 1994, GATT 
promoted liberal trading principles among member countries. The GATT 
functioned through a series of meetings known as ‘rounds,’ at which member 
countries negotiated and came to agreement on trade concessions. Among 
the consensuses achieved by GATT were tariff reductions, anti-dumping 
legislation, and removal of barriers to trade.  
 The decision of the United States government to encourage the use 
of voluntary export restraint (VER) as a trade strategy began with the Truman 
administration in 1952, and continued through the Eisenhower, Kennedy, 
Johnson, and Nixon administrations. To the United States, the VER was a 
preferred strategy to the outright imposition of quotas on imports. United 
States preference for the VER lay in the fact that, although export restraints 
were contrary to Articles XI and XIII of GATT that prohibited quotas against 
exports and imports, the VER was self-imposed by the exporting country. It 
was also bilateral, existing only between the two trading partners. Thus, while 
the real purpose of the VER was to reduce imports, only the exporting 
country could implement it, and implementation was on a voluntary basis.12  
Nominally, the use of the VER was inconsistent with the United 
States Most Favored Nation (MFN) policy. This trade policy stipulated 
nondiscrimination in the application of tariff and trade concessions to all 
other GATT signatories. However, the VER worked in favor of the United 
States, compared to quotas on foreign goods. In urging exporting countries 
to use the VER, the United States could maintain its adherence to free trade, 
while at the same time implementing protectionist policies to reduce imports 
from other countries. Further, because the VER was voluntary and bilateral, 
the United States was protected from having quotas imposed on its exports 
by countries not party to it. Superficially, the VER was a strategy that was 
                                                 
12 William McClenahan, “The Growth of Voluntary Export Restraints and 
American Foreign Economic Policy, 1956–1969,” Business and Economic 
History 20 (1991): 180–190. 
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self-imposed by Japan. In fact, its use was encouraged by the United States 
government, rendering its implementation contradictory to the free-trade 
principles of capitalism.  
 
Japanese Government Intervention 
The post-World War II era was a period of expansion for the 
Japanese economy. Japan moved from exporting textiles in the 1950s to 
being an exporter of major goods such as automobiles, steel, and ships two 
decades later. In the late-1980s, Japan experienced a rapid increase in asset 
prices. This period is referred to as the bubble era,13 and is determined to have 
been prompted by the sharp appreciation of the Japanese yen, the elevation 
of stock prices above their real values, and three decades of sustained 
economic growth that gave Japanese automobile assemblers an advantage 
over their foreign competitors. 
 Several factors contributed to the emergence of the Japanese bubble. 
First, the yen doubled in value against the U.S. dollar, from 1985 to 1993. In 
1985, one U.S. dollar was valued at 250 yen; by April 1993, one U.S. dollar 
exchanged for 113 yen. In effect, Japanese interest rates declined to 
historically low levels. In 1987, the official Japanese discount rate on bank 
borrowing was at 2.5 percent, half of what it was in 1985. The combination 
of currency appreciation and low interest rates translated into high 
consumption and investment in the Japanese economy. 
Second, with easy access to money and increasing asset prices, firms 
were reluctant to borrow from banks. As asset prices rose, their increase 
reinforced the value of hidden assets on corporate balance sheets, which 
elevated stock prices beyond their real value. Corporations shifted their 
financing from debt to equity by issuing convertible and warrant bonds. 
Banks shifted their focus from relationship lending to speculating in real 
estate and the stock market.  
Finally, as mentioned earlier, thirty years of sustained economic 
growth had given the Japanese automobile assemblers a significant 
advantage over their international competitors. The bubble burst in 
December 1989 after several increases in the official discount rate in the 
preceding period by the Bank of Japan. The Japanese stock market crashed 
                                                 
13 Chris Lin, The Japanese Automotive Industry: Recent Developments and 
Future Competitive Outlook (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Office for the Study of 
Automotive Transportation, University of Michigan, May 1994), 38. 
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in early 1990, and by the spring of 1992, the Nikkei index was at 16,500 after 
falling from a high of 38,000 in the previous two years.14 
The 1980s Japanese bubble was a contributing factor, but the 
Japanese economic model was also critical to the success of the economy. 
Inherent in the model was an industrial policy that consisted of government 
control of the economy.15 The Japanese Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (MITI) was instrumental in implementing the country’s industrial 
policy. Its strategies, inter alia, consisted of trade protection measures, 
support to companies in the form of allocations of foreign exchange, research 
and development subsidies, loans at below-market interest rates, loans that 
were repaid only if the firm became profitable, favorable tax treatment, and 
joint government-industry research projects intended to develop promising 
technologies. The Japanese automobile industry benefitted from the 
industrial policy, and became the leading global exporter. The intervention 
of the Japanese government in the economy was within the framework of the 
East Asian Model, a phenomenon that had ultimately led to the rapid growth 
of East Asian economies in the post-World War II period. Perhaps, the last 
word on the intervention of the Japanese government in the economy should 
be left to the Governor of the Bank of Japan, Yasushi Mieno, who made the 
following statement at the annual meeting of the World Bank in October 
1991:  
 
 Experience in Asia has shown that although development 
strategies require a healthy respect for market mechanisms, 
the role of government cannot be forgotten. I would like to 
see the World Bank and the IMF take the lead in a wide-
ranging study that would define the theoretical under-
pinnings of this approach and clarify the areas in which it 
can be successfully applied to other parts of the globe.16 
 
 
                                                 
14 Ibid., 39. 
15 Carbaugh, International Economics, 216. 
16 Yasushi Mieno, Reading, World Bank Annual Meeting, World Bank Press 
Release 16, Bangkok, October 1991; cited in C. Johnson, “Comparative 
Capitalism: The Japanese Difference.” California Management Review 
(1993), 51.  
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The VER in Perspective 
Japan was accepted into GATT in 1955, in spite of global 
resentment due to its role as aggressor in World War II. This was also the 
period in which the United States government began its use of VERs as a 
trade strategy. The initial United States-Japan VER was the restriction on 
Japan’s exports of tuna. With Japan's membership in GATT and its rise as a 
competitive exporter, the United States government continued to promote 
VERs on Japanese exports of velveteen (1956), cotton textiles (1957), and 
sewing machines together with a range of other goods (1958). By 1960, under 
United States trade policy, there were more than 30 products on its Japanese 
VER list. In 1969, the United States placed Japanese steel on the VER list, 
while wool, electronic articles and textiles, and a number of other products 
made the list in 1970.17 
 In October 1973, OPEC implemented the first global increase in the 
price of oil. This resulted in a global recession, which was further intensified 
by a greater oil price increase in 1979. The United States, along with the 
Netherlands, suffered the additional blow of an embargo on oil shipments by 
the OPEC countries because of their apparent support of Israel. The recession 
and the increase in the price of gasoline led to a decline in the demand for 
automobiles worldwide. In the United States, the domestic automobile 
industry experienced a reduction in sales and profits. At the same time, 
American consumers were increasing their demand for Japanese 
automobiles, which were of higher fuel efficiency than those manufactured 
by American companies. By 1981, the Japanese share of the United States 
automobile market was 22 percent. In the same year, Chrysler had to be saved 
from bankruptcy by a subsidized United States government loan.18  
The American automobile industry lobby called upon the 
government for protection from Japanese imports. After discussions with 
U.S. trade representatives, the Japanese announced its decision to implement 
the VER in May 1981. Under the terms of agreement, Japanese automobile 
manufacturers would limit exports of automobiles to the United States until 
1994. Berry et al19 report that the reduction in Japanese imports due to the 
                                                 
17 McClenahan, “The Growth of Voluntary Export Restraints,” 180–190. 
18
 Steven Berry, James Levinsohn, and Ariel Pakes. “Voluntary Export 
Restraints on Automobiles: Evaluating a Trade Policy.” American Economic 
Review 89/3 (1999): 400–430. 
19 Ibid. 
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VER led to an increase in the price of Japanese automobiles. Sales and prices 
of American cars also increased, as did the profits of their manufacturers. 
The Japanese factories did not suffer from the VER. The United 
States restriction on Japanese exports by way of the VER was on the number 
of vehicles, not the dollar value of trade. The VER also covered automobiles 
imported directly from Japan, not those assembled in the United States by 
Japanese companies. The Japanese manufacturers were able to circumvent 
the VER by shipping unassembled cars to Taiwan and South Korea for 
assembly and subsequent shipping to the United States. They also upgraded 
the quality of their products by introducing new luxury cars such as the 
Lexus, Acura, and Infiniti, developed by Toyota, Honda and Nissan. The 
higher prices of these new models reduced the negative effects of the VER, 
as higher revenues and profits were guaranteed for a lower number of units. 
However, the most effective strategy used by the Japanese manufacturers was 
direct investment in automobile plants in the United States. Honda was the 
first to establish an automobile factory when it opened its plant in Marysville, 
Ohio, in 1982. By 1990, Nissan, Toyota, Mazda, and Mitsubishi were all 
manufacturing automobiles in the United States.20  
 
The Impact of the VER – Winners and Losers 
In the early years, 1981 to 1983, the VER had no impact on the 
American economy due to the recession. In this period, the United States 
economy was beset with high interest rates, high unemployment, and low 
demand for automobiles. The VER had a slight impact in 1984 and 1985, but 
its effects were felt mainly between 1986 and 1990. This latter period was 
one of recovery for the U.S. economy. Low interest rates and low gasoline 
prices led to an increase in the demand for new automobiles. The results of 
research by Berry et al21 are that in the period of 1986 to 1990, the price of 
Japanese cars increased by 14 percent while that of American manufactures 
increased by 1 percent. The researchers also report that the dollar value of 
increased profits of United States automobile makers was $2 billion 
(approximately 8 percent) per year between 1986 and 1990. 
                                                 
20 David Benjamin, “Voluntary Export Restraints on Automobiles,” PERC 
Reports 17/3 (1999) (accessed May 7, 2017, https://www.perc.org/articles/ 
voluntary-export-restraints-automobiles). 
21 Berry, Levinson, and Pakes, “Evaluating a Trade Policy,” 400–430. 
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 In addition, John C. Ries22 used stock price movements of seven 
Japanese automakers and sixty-nine of their suppliers to study the effects of 
the VER on Japanese automakers. He concluded that the VER increased 
profits of producers of passenger cars, as well as large suppliers and 
producers of specialized parts and services. Ries also concluded that the 
profits were the result of restrictions on the number of automobiles the 
Japanese could export rather than on the dollar value of trade.  
If the winners under the VER were the American and Japanese 
automobile manufacturers, then who were the losers? According to Berry et 
al, the price increases on domestic and Japanese automobiles equated to a 
loss to American consumers of $13 billion over the period of the VER, 1981 
to 1994. The welfare loss to the United States economy totaled $3 billion.23 
Ries concluded that while Japanese manufacturers benefited, suppliers did 
not share in the windfall, as the effect of VER on the profits of auto suppliers 
depended on the price of parts.24 
In 1985, the United States International Trade Commission 
published its report on the assessment of the American automobile industry.25 
The project entailed the quantification of the effects of the VER on the 
automobile industry, and on United States employment and consumers. The 
VER came into effect in 1981, but the report covered the period 1979 to 1984. 
Inclusion of the pre-VER years allowed for comparison with the earlier years 
of the VER, 1981 to 1984. Compared with the pre-VER years, the report 
concludes that during the period of the VER, prices of both domestic and 
Japanese automobiles increased, thus raising the cost to American 
consumers. Profits to domestic producers and the number of jobs in the 
automobile industry also increased. Data from the International Trade 
Commission report are replicated in Table 1 below. 
 
                                                 
22 John C. Ries, “Windfall Profits and Vertical Relationships: Who Gained in 
the Japanese Auto Industry from VERs?” The Journal of Industrial 
Economics 41/3 (1993): 259–276. 
23 Berry, Levinson, Pakes, “Evaluating a Trade Policy,” 400–430. 
24 Ries, “Windfall Profits and Vertical Relationships,” 259–276. 
25
 United States International Trade Commission, A Review of Recent 
Developments in the U.S. Automobile Industry Including an Assessment of 
the Japanese Voluntary Restraint Agreements (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1985). 
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Table 1. United States Automobile Industry (1979 to 1984)26 
*Total for six domestic producers of automobiles in the United States. 
**Data are for January to June 1984. 
 
Government Intervention Versus Liberalization – An Observation 
In the market system, there is a sense of inevitability that the 
government will intervene in the economy. As Medema posits, “the issue is 
not more versus less government (or big versus small government), but rather 
to whose interests government gives effect.”27 This perspective is evident in 
the actions of both the Japanese and American governments with respect to 
the trade conflict that beset the automobile industry in the 1980s. While in 
Japan various factors such as the reaffirmation of ancient Confucian values, 
self-sacrifice, and educational reform have been cited as being responsible 
                                                 
26 Ibid.  
27 Medema, “Another Look at the Problem of Rent Seeking,” 1050. 
Item 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
Auto Production  
(thousands of units) 
8,413 6,377 6,253 5,072 5,980 7,400 
Imports of Japanese 
Automobiles  
(thousands of units) 
1,617 1,992 1,911 1,801 1,871 1,970 
Avg. Price of 
Domestic Automobiles 
Sold in US, 1981-1984  
(US dollars/unit) 
- - 8,929 9,889 10,505 10,998 
Avg. Price of Japanese 
Automobiles Sold in 
US, 1980-1984 
 (US dollars/unit) 
- 6,709 7,292 7,539 8,317 9,300 
Increase in Avg.  
Price of Japanese 
Automobiles in US 
from VER, 1981-1984 
(US dollars/unit) 
- - 78 170 426 659 
Net US Auto  
Industry Sales* 
(millions of US dollars) 
88,413 72,100 80,734 79,495 108,003 131,000** 
Net US Auto Industry  
Profit or (Loss)* 
(millions of US dollars) 
(400) (4,667) (2,296) (553) 5,330 10,400** 
Employment in US 
Auto Industry  
(number of employees) 
929,214 740,191 723,946 622,885 656,970 720,448** 
Additional US Auto 
Industry Jobs from 
VER, 1981-1984  
(number of jobs) 
- - 5,400 9,100 25,600 44,100 
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for the growth of the economy in the post-World War II period, a major factor 
has been intervention in the economy by the Japanese government by way of 
its industrial policy. In the United States, intervention in the economy has 
been mainly through fiscal, monetary, and trade policies.  
Much has been written about the economic successes and failures 
of East Asian countries, including Japan and the Asian Tigers (Singapore, 
South Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan) through application of the East Asian 
model, which sanctioned government intervention in the economy. At the 
urging of the Japanese government, the World Bank economists conducted 
research and prepared a report on the East Asian model. The report was 
published in book form and titled, The East Asian Miracle.28 The conclusions 
made in this document were disappointing to the Japanese government, as 
they undermined the idea of an East Asian Model and negated the belief that 
government intervention had contributed to the success of the East Asian 
economies. The World Bank, in fact, asserted that the growth of the Japanese 
economy (and the economies of East Asia) was not because of government 
intervention, but rather, had been the result of western liberalization policies 
such as fiscal and market discipline. The typical western view was thus 
perpetrated, which, in effect, supported the Washington Consensus that 
advocated globalization and free trade. As if to confirm the World Bank’s 
conclusion, the East Asian economies were devastated by the financial crisis 
of the 1990s. 
In spite of the World Bank view, voices were raised against the 
rigidity of the Washington Consensus and in support of government 
intervention in the economy. Joseph Stiglitz argues that the policies of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) contributed to bringing about the East 
Asian financial crisis, as well as the Argentine economic crisis.29 In addition, 
he criticizes the policies of the World Bank, the IMF and the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), which he claims are based on neoliberal assumptions 
that are fundamentally unsound. In Stiglitz’ own words: 
 
Behind the free market ideology there is a model, often 
attributed to Adam Smith, which argues that market 
                                                 
28 World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 259–368. 
29 Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents (New York: W.W. 
Norton and Company, 2003).  
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forces–the profit motive–drive the economy to efficient 
outcomes as if by an invisible hand… Smith's conclusion 
is correct. It turns out that these conditions are highly 
restrictive. Indeed, more recent advances in economic 
theory–ironically occurring precisely during the period of 
the most relentless pursuit of the Washington Consensus 
policies–have shown that whenever information is 
imperfect and markets incomplete… then the invisible 
hand works most imperfectly. Significantly, there are 
desirable government interventions which, in principle, can 
improve upon the efficiency of the market. These 
restrictions on the conditions under which markets result in 
efficiency are important…  If competition were 
automatically perfect, there would be no role for antitrust 
authorities.30 
 
Therefore, the view of the neoclassical public choice school is that 
government intervention in the economy creates rents, economic actors 
expend resources in the pursuit of these rents, and that such expenditures are 
wasted from society’s perspective. Thus, Stiglitz’ observations are in direct 
contrast with the neoclassical position that strictly prohibits government 
intervention in the economy. 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
This study set out to analyze rent-seeking arising from government 
intervention in the economy to address the United States-Japan automobile 
trade conflict of the 1980s. Both governments intervened in an effort to assist 
their respective automobile sectors. The American government subtly 
applied pressure on Japanese automobile manufacturers to implement 
voluntary export restraints (VERs) and reduce their exports to the United 
States. Under the industrial policy of the Japanese government, the 
automobile industry benefitted from special treatment that included 
subsidies, loans and tax concessions. 
In the end, the automobile manufacturers in both countries earned 
high profits from increased prices of their products, while United States 
consumers paid higher prices for both domestic and Japanese automobiles. 
                                                 
30 Ibid, 73. 
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American consumers were also denied the right to choose the type of vehicle 
they preferred to purchase. The American economy experienced a welfare 
loss, but there was a subsequent increase in the number of jobs in the 
automobile industry because the Japanese established new factories in the 
United States. However, whether through the VERs or industrial policy, both 
the American and Japanese governments intervened in the economy, stifling 
competition and consequently, manipulating the functioning of the price 
mechanism that is at the core of the market system. The result was the 
creation of rents, and competition among economic players for these rents. 
The automobile industries of both countries were the winners gaining profits 
in the process, as was the American economy, due to the increase in 
automobile industry jobs. As expected, when rents are present, there must be 
losers, and this fell on the American consumers through higher prices for 
automobiles. Yet, three decades after the Japanese VER was implemented, 
government intervention again became necessary for the continued survival 
of the American automobile industry. 
